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SPLIT DECISIONS IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
RESTITUTION CASES FURTHER INJURE
THE VICTIMS
Melisa Medina*
INTRODUCTION
“It started like so many other instances of child exploitation: Amy’s
uncle showed her pornography and then began raping her on a regular
basis.” 1 Child pornography has been a despicable tragedy for many
years. The distribution of child pornography has “grown exponentially”
because of the accessibility of the internet.2 Images of child pornography
create a permanent record of a child’s abuse. Congress enacted the
Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of
Children section under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) of
1994 (18 U.S.C.A. § 2259) in order to mandate that the child
pornography viewer pay the “full term of the victim’s losses.” 3 Court
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law; B.S. 1993,
Michigan State University.
1
Lorelei Laird, Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the
Victims?, ABA Journal (Sept. 1, 2012, 5:30 AM); http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/
article/pricing_amy_should_those_who_download_child_pornography_pay_the_victims.
2
Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 3, Amy v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (2011) (No. 11-85).
3
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 1996), stating:
(a) In general.—Notwithstanding section 3663 or 3663A, and in addition to any
other civil or criminal penalty authorized by law, the court shall order restitution for
any offense under this chapter.
(b) Scope and nature of order.—
(1) Directions.—The order of restitution under this section shall direct the defendant
to pay the victim (through the appropriate court mechanism) the full amount of the
victim’s losses as determined by the court pursuant to paragraph (2).
(2) Enforcement.—An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and
enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under
section 3663A.
(3) Definition.—For purposes of this subsection, the term “full amount of the
victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the victim for—
(A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care;
(B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation;
(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses;
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decisions have been divided when applying section 2259 because of the
issue on whether the victim’s losses must be proximately caused by the
possession of the pornography. 4 Many courts also question how to
determine the amount of restitution to be paid.5 The division within the
courts adds to the uncertainty for the child pornography victims. It seems
likely that if child pornography offenders are consistently penalized
harshly for possessing and viewing the images, the demand for child
pornography would decrease.6 The intention of the statute is clear; yet,
the application of the statute has left much confusion and uncertainty for
the courts and the victims alike. .
Part I of this note will discuss the harm that child pornography does
to the victims, and society as a whole. Part II will provide an overview of
the important acts that led to the passage of section 2259. Part III will
analyze the proximate cause requirement and the split court decisions.
Part IV will discuss the calculations of restitution and the issue of
whether joint and several liability should be applied. Finally, Part V will
suggest possible alternatives to create consistencies across the courts.
THE HARM CHILD PORNOGRAPHY INFLICTS ON VICTIMS AND SOCIETY
Victims of child pornography have long-lasting scars. Not only do
victims have to overcome the horror of the act(s), but they now have to
deal with the looming question as to whether that crime was recorded
and distributed in the black market world of child pornography. One
victim, Ms. X, described her feelings, explaining what she lives every
day:
(D) lost income;
(E) attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and
(F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.
(4) Order mandatory.—(A) The issuance of a restitution order under this section is
mandatory.
(B) A court may not decline to issue an order under this section because of—
(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or
(ii) the fact that a victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her
injuries from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.
(c) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the term “victim” means the individual
harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter, including, in the
case of a victim who is under 18 years of age, incompetent, incapacitated, or
deceased, the legal guardian of the victim or representative of the victim’s estate,
another family member, or any other person appointed as suitable by the court, but
in no event shall the defendant be named as such representative or guardian.
4
Laird, supra note 1.
5
United States v. Tallent, 872 F. Supp. 2d 679, 681 (E.D. Tenn. 2012).
6
Tyler Morris, Perverted Justice: Why Courts are Ruling Against Restitution in Child
Pornography Possession Cases, and How a Victim Compensation Fund Can Fix the
Broken Restitution Framework, 57 VILL. L. REV. 391, 391 (2012) (discussing the
problems of the restitution framework as it currently stands).
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with the horrible knowledge that someone somewhere is
watching the most terrifying moments of my life and taking
grotesque pleasure in them. . . Everyday people are trading and
sharing videos of me as a little girl being raped in the most
sadistic ways. . . They’re being entertained by my shame and
pain. . . [The knowledge that my images are being circulated on
the internet] has given me a paranoia.7

Child pornography is essentially a set of crime scene photos that are
a permanent record of the crime committed against the child. 8 “Once
these images are on the Internet, they are irretrievable and can continue
to circulate forever. The child is re-victimized as the images are viewed
again and again.”9 It is unclear how far back child pornography images
began circulating, but court records have shown that images date back to
1998.10
The court in United States v. Klein, stated that “as a permanent
record of a child’s abuse, the continued circulation itself would harm the
child who had participated. Like a defamatory statement, each new
publication of the speech would cause new injury to the child’s
reputation and emotional well-being.”11 One court indicated that victims
of child pornography suffer harm in three ways. The first harm is that the
images have been disseminated and become a permanent record of the
abuse.12 The second harm is the invasion of the victim’s privacy.13 The
third harm is that the consumer of child pornography prompts additional
production, and an economic motive, for producing and distributing
more pornographic materials.14 One victim, Amy, explained that she was
unable to get over the abuse that she suffered at the hands of her uncle
because the “disgusting images of what he did to [her] are still out there
on the internet.”15 Another victim described the viewing and trading of
child pornography as synonymous with “trading my trauma around like

7

United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011).
What is Child Pornography?, NATIONAL CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED
CHILDREN, http://bannerb.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?Language
Country=en_US&PageId=2451 (lasted visited March 11, 2013).
9
Id.
10
Laird, supra note 1, at 1.
11
United States v. Klein, 829 F. Supp. 2d 597, 604 (S.D. H Ohio 2011).
12
United States v. Hagerman, 827 F. Supp. 2d 102, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) rev’d and
remanded, 506 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing, U.S. v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204,
1208 (11th Cir.2011).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
United States v. Aumais, 656 F.3d 147, 149 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2011).
8
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treats at a party.” 16 Some of these victims suffer night terrors, panic
attacks, depression, alcohol abuse, a reluctance to socialize, and an
inability to finish college or hold employment. 17 Psychologists have
recognized that the victim’s knowledge of the disseminated pornographic
images are a significant part of the victimization.18
In 2010, the Crime Victim Identification Program conducted over
4,800 evidence reviews containing more than 13.6 million images of
child pornography. 19 The National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children has identified and reported over 35,570 images of Amy, the
victim.20 This epidemic is not going away—it is getting stronger. Victims
of child pornography suffer severe harms from the “permanent
memorialization” of the crime.21 An expert classified the type of trauma
to be a Type II trauma, which is equivalent to the type of trauma suffered
by people who lived near a war zone. 22 Victims are further injured
because of their inability to remove the images that are circulating on a
daily basis. 23 Some victims are concerned about being recognized in
public by the offenders that have downloaded the images of their abuse.24
One victim was being harassed and stalked by an offender who made
attempts to contact her asking if she would be willing to make a
pornographic video with him. 25 Another victim was stalked by a man
who admitted that he had searched for her for five years on the internet.26
Under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA), victims of child
pornography must be notified by the government any time a person is
arrested for possessing their images.27 Upon receiving the notifications,
16

United States v. Ontiveros, No. 2:08-CR-81 JVB, 2011 WL 2447721, at *4 (N.D. Ind.
June 15, 2011).
17
Pricing Amy and United States v. Kennedy, 634 F.3d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir. 2011).
18
Ontiveros at 4.
19
Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 4, Amy v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (2011) (No. 11-85).
20
Morris, supra note 6, at 395, 396.
21
Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 9, Amy v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (2011) (No. 11-85).
22
United States v. Kearney, 672 F. 3d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 2012).
23
Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 12, Amy v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (2011) (No. 11-85).
24
Laird, supra note 1, at 5.
25
Kearney, 672 F. 3d at 86-87.
26
United States v. Strayer, No. 8:08CR482, 2010 WL 2560466 at *3 (D. Neb. June 24,
2010).
27
Laird, supra note 1, at 2; see also, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 which states the crime victim
has the following rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court
proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or
escape of the accused.
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the doctor for a victim named Vicky, compared the trauma to represent
“a chronic, toxic condition . . . which continuously works like corrosive
acid on the psyche of the individual.” 28 Vicky explained that the
notifications are an everyday reminder that someone is watching “the
most terrifying moments of my life and taking grotesque pleasure in
them.”29 Technology today not only enables offenders to commit crimes
more easily, but it also “amplifies the nature of the harm done to the
victim and the number of offenders doing harm to a particular victim.”30
The harm to the victim is not in dispute; what is in dispute is how to
create a deterrent for offenders that will be consistent and effective.
ACTS THAT HAVE LED TO THE PASSAGE OF 18 U.S.C.A. § 2259
Historically, restitution was an “offender-based remedy” that was
used to promote the rehabilitation of the offender.31 In the 1970’s, there
was a movement to have victims more involved in the prosecution of
their offenders: although, it wasn’t until the 1980’s that protection for
child pornography statutes began to appear. 32 A report by President
Ronald Reagan’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982, observed that
the “pleas for justice [by victims] have gone unheeded.” 33 One of the
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the
court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by
the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that
proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court
involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and
privacy.
28
Kearney, 672 F. 3d at 87.
29
McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1206.
30
Brief of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 15, Amy v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528 (2011) (No. 11-85).
31
Robert William Jacques, Note, Amy and Vicky’s Cause: Perils of the Federal
Restitution Framework for Child Pornography Victims, 45 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1176
(2011) (discussing the history of restitution and the changes made to become more victim
focused).
32
Id. at 1177.
33
Id.; Final Report of the President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS: OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/
publications/presdntstskforcrprt/welcome.html. (“President Ronald Reagan created the
President’s Task Force on Victims of Crime in 1982 to address the needs of the millions
of Americans and their families who are victimized by crime every year. In creating its
report, the task force reviewed the available literature on criminal victimization,
interviewed professionals responsible for serving victims, and spoke with citizens from
around the country whose lives have been altered by crime.”).
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major goals in the victims’ rights movement was to expand the
restitution mechanism to be more of a means to compensate and make
the victim whole from the losses accrued from the actions of the
offender.34 In 1982, the Victim Witness Protection Act (VWPA) allowed
courts to impose restitution for victims and required the victim to prepare
a “victim impact statement” to assess the effect of the defendant’s crime
on the victim.35
“Congress . . . has recognized the unique and pervasive harms
inflicted by the production, distribution, and possession of child
pornography, and has acted repeatedly to combat this growing
contagion.” 36 To combat this concern, Congress passed the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251). 37 Congress recognized the harm to children by stating that
34

Id. at 1178.
Restitutional Sentencing under Victim and Witness Protection Act § 5,18 U.S.C.A. §§
3579, 3580 (1996) stating: The Act amended Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, hereinafter referred to as Rule 32, to require the preparation of a victim impact
statement as part of the presentence investigative report, to assess the effect of the
defendant’s crime on the victim. Rule 32(c)(2)(C), as amended, provides that the
presentence report shall contain (1) information concerning any harm, including
financial, social, psychological, and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim
of the offense; and (2) any other information that may aid the court in sentencing,
including the restitution needs of any victim of the offense. However, effective
November 1, 1986, Rule 32(c)(2) has been amended further to provide that such
information concerning the victim must be verified and stated in a “nonargumentative
style.”
36
Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Amy, the Victim in the “Misty” Child
Pornography Series at 7.
37
Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Amy, the Victim in the “Misty” Child
Pornography Series at 8, see also, statute 18 U.S.C.§ 2251 for defining the sexual
exploitation of children as:
(a) Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, or who has a minor assist any other person to engage in, or who
transports any minor in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or in any
Territory or Possession of the United States, with the intent that such minor engage
in, any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction
of such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such
conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e), if such person knows or
has reason to know that such visual depiction will be transported or transmitted
using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced or
transmitted using materials that have been mailed, shipped, or transported in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, or if
such visual depiction has actually been transported or transmitted using any means
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed.
(b) Any parent, legal guardian, or person having custody or control of a minor who
knowingly permits such minor to engage in, or to assist any other person to engage
in, sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of
35
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“child pornography permanently records the victim’s abuse, and its
continued existence causes the victims of sexual abuse continuing harm
by haunting those children in future years.” 38 Earlier, Congress had
enacted the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act in 1994,
which ordered guilty defendants to pay restitution for certain crimes,
including the exploitation of children.39 Though not all earlier acts passed
to protect victims mandated restitution, Congress saw the need for
restitution when it passed the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act
(MVRA) of 1996. 40 The MVRA governs restitution awards to child
pornography victims and directs the defendant to pay the victim “the full
amount of the victim’s losses.”41
A victim is defined in the statute as “the individual harmed as a
result of a commission of a crime under this chapter.” 42 Courts have
recognized that a victim of child pornography possession constitutes a
“victim” according to the definition in the statute.43 As for the remedy,
such conduct or for the purpose of transmitting a live visual depiction of such
conduct shall be punished as provided under subsection (e) of this section, if such
parent, legal guardian, or person knows or has reason to know that such visual
depiction will be transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate
or foreign commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed, if
that visual depiction was produced or transmitted using materials that have been
mailed, shipped, or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any
means, including by computer, or if such visual depiction has actually been
transported or transmitted using any means or facility of interstate or foreign
commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
(c)(1) Any person who, in a circumstance described in paragraph (2), employs, uses,
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in, or who has a minor
assist any other person to engage in, any sexually explicit conduct outside of the
United States, its territories or possessions, for the purpose of producing any visual
depiction of such conduct, shall be punished as provided under subsection (e).
38
Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari for Amy, the Victim in the “Misty” Child
Pornography Series, at 8.
39
Ashleigh B. Boe, Putting a Price on Child Porn: Requiring Defendants Who Possess
Child Pornography Images to Pay Restitution to Child Pornography Victims, 86 N.D. L.
REV. 205, 210 (2010) (discussing the history of federal criminal restitution laws).
40
Brief on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Amy, the Victim in the “Misty” Child
Pornography Series at 8 see also, 18 U.S.C.A § 3663(a) which orders the defendant to
pay restitution
(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim—
(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional
services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care,
including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of
healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment;
B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy
and rehabilitation; and
(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense.
41
United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
42
18 U.S.C.A. §2259 (West 1996).
43
Ontiveros, at 2.
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18 U.S.C.A. section 2259 also requires that the court order restitution
without considering the economic circumstances of the defendant or
whether the victim received compensation for his or her injuries from the
insurance or other sources.44
The issue that has split many circuits is the proximate cause
requirement.45 The statute states:
(3) Definition. For purposes of this subsection, the term “full
amount of the victim’s losses” includes any costs incurred by the
victim for (A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric,
or psychological care; (B) physical and occupational therapy or
rehabilitation; (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing,
and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) attorney’s fees, as
well as other costs incurred; and (F) any other losses suffered by
the victim as a proximate result of the offense. 46

The split among the courts mainly rests on subsection (F) and
whether or not the requirement for proximate cause should only be
applied to subsection (F), or if Congress intended the proximate cause
requirement to apply to subsections (A) through (E) as well. Part III of
this note will analyze the inconsistent decisions regarding this issue.
PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT
When evaluating the plain language of the statute, it is unclear
whether Congress intended that a proximate cause requirement for all
injuries listed in the statute applies or, whether the proximate cause
44

18 U.S.C.A. §2259 (West 1996).
Proximate Cause, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, (2008), available at http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/But+for+causation. (defines proximate cause as An act
from which an injury results as a natural, direct, uninterrupted consequence and without
which the injury would not have occurred. Proximate cause is the primary cause of an
injury. It is not necessarily the closest cause in time or space nor the first event that sets
in motion a sequence of events leading to an injury. Proximate cause produces particular,
foreseeable consequences without the intervention of any independent or unforeseeable
cause. It is also known as legal cause. To help determine the proximate cause of an injury
in Negligence or other tort cases, courts have devised the “but for” or “sine qua non” rule,
which considers whether the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s
negligent act. A finding that an injury would not have occurred but for a defendant’s act
establishes that the particular act or omission is the proximate cause of the harm, but it
does not necessarily establish liability since a variety of other factors can come into play
in tort actions. Some jurisdictions apply the “substantial factor” formula to determine
proximate cause. This rule considers whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial
factor in producing the harm. If the act was a substantial factor in bringing about the
damage, then the defendant will be held liable unless she can raise a sufficient defense to
rebut the claims.).
46
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 1996).
45
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requirement was only intended for subsection (F), which includes “any
other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.”47
Most of the discrepancies in the awards granted by the courts are a
reflection of this uncertainty.
Courts Applying Proximate Cause to Subsections (A) through (F) of
18 U.S.C.A. 2259
Many courts have read section 2259(b)(3)(F) as applying the phrase
“suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense” to all of the
types of losses listed in section 2259(b)(3).48 The court, in United States
v. Monzel, applied the traditional principles of tort and criminal law,
which state that the defendant is only liable for the harms he proximately
caused. 49 The Monzel court stated that the purpose of the proximate
cause rule is that “legal responsibility must be limited to those causes
which are so closely connected with the result and of such significance
that the law is justified in imposing liability.”50 Another argument that
supports the proximate cause requirement on all subsections is in United
States v. McDaniel; there, the court explains the construction of words in
a clause: “[w]hen several words are followed by a clause which is
applicable as much to the first and other words as to the last, the natural
construction of the language demands that the clause be read as
applicable to all.”51
In United States v. Aumais, the court recognized this explanation,
and further added that the phrase “as a proximate result of the offense”
equally applies to, among other things, medical care, attorney fees, and
lost income as it would to “any other losses.”52 The court explained that
proximate cause limits the responsibility of the defendant for the
consequences of the defendant’s own actions demanding some “direct
relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”53
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Kennedy stated
that the definition of “victim” according to the VWPA and the MVRA
includes the terminology of being “a person directly and proximately
harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution
may be ordered.”54 Because of the wording of that definition, the court
47

Id.
Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152.
49
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 535.
50
Monzel, 641 F.3d at 535-36.
51
McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1209 (quoting Porto Rico R., Light & Power Co. v. Mor, 253
U.S. 345, 348 (1920)).
52
Aumais, 656 F.3d at 153.
53
Id.
54
Kennedy, 643 F.3d, at 1261.
48
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held that restitution should be awarded only in circumstances where the
conduct of defendant was the “actual and proximate cause.”55 In section
2259(b), the enforcement of the restitution order is issued and enforced
“in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under
section 3663(a).”56
The Kennedy court acknowledged that the three statutes have
similar restitutionary purposes so the proximate cause requirement would
naturally flow into section 2259. 57 The wording in section 2259(c)
defines “victim” as an individual harmed “as a result of”—this language
implies that the government intended to establish a causal connection
between the injury and the actions of the defendant. 58 However, the
counter argument is that in the definition of “victim” within section
2259, if Congress had intended that the proximate cause requirement was
to cover all of the victim’s losses, the wording “proximately harmed”
would have been added; yet, it was not.59 The government proved that
Kennedy had viewed the images (of Amy and Vicky), and established
that he contributed to the generalized harm; however, the government
was unsuccessful in connecting the injury of the victims to the actions of
the defendant. 60 The court further added that it has not found a case
where the “relationship as remote as that between Kennedy’s conduct
and the victims’ losses . . . held sufficient for an award of restitution.”61
The government in Kennedy failed to show how Kennedy’s action of
transporting the images of child pornography caused Amy’s lost income
or Vicky’s future counseling costs. 62 The government could not show
evidence that Amy and Vicky were aware of Kennedy’s conduct.63 For
those reasons, the Ninth Circuit vacated the order granting restitution.64
Courts Applying the Proximate Cause Requirement Only to Subsection
(F)
Some courts, like the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Amy
Unknown, have determined that other courts erred when applying the
proximate cause requirement to all subsections (A) through (F).65 The
55

Id.
18 U.S.C.A. § 2259 (West 1996).
57
Kennedy, 634 F.3d at 1262.
58
Kennedy, 634 F.3d at 1260.
59
Id. at 1261.
60
Id. at 1264.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 1262.
63
Id. at 1263.
64
Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1265.
65
Amy Unknown v. Paroline, 636 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 2011).

56
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district court in United States v. Paroline held that the proximate cause
requirement was not confined to only subsection (F), but applied to each
category listed.66 Victim Amy appealed the lower court’s decision and
the Fifth Circuit agreed with Amy that the language and structure of
section 2259(b)(3) imposed the proximate cause requirement only on the
miscellaneous “other losses” that the victim was seeking to recover.67
The court explained that Congress was aware of many types of expenses
that the victims would accumulate because of the crime, but could not
anticipate other types of expenses, so the proximate cause requirement
was added to the “other expenses” category.68 In United States v. Fast,
the court stated that it would make sense “that Congress would impose
an additional restriction on the catchall category of “other losses” that
does not apply to the defined categories.”69 The VWPA was passed by
Congress in 1982.70 The Act defined a “victim” to be a “person directly
and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense…”71
In contrast, section 2259 defines a victim to be an “individual
harmed as a result of a commission of a crime.” 72 It is apparent that
Congress abandoned the proximate cause language to have it reach all
categories of harm by dropping the words “proximately harmed” stated
in the earlier statute.73 This change is consistent with the intent of later
restitution statutes to expand the restitution remedy and reflects a more
“pro-victim” attitude.74 The court in United States v. Fast, addressed the
changes to the statutes and stated that the “evolution in victims’ rights
statutes demonstrates Congress’s choice to abandon a global requirement
of proximate causation.”75
The statute lists different types of costs in sections (A) through (E)
that the victim may have incurred, and ends with section (F) that states as
a catchall “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result
of the offense.” The courts have wrestled with the question as to whether
the proximate cause requirement applies to all of section 2259(b)(3)(A)
through (F) or only the catchall subsection (F). Some courts apply the
proximate cause requirement to all subsections and either award a small
66
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amount or zero restitution to the victim, while other courts apply the
proximate cause requirement only to subsection (F) and award extremely
large awards of restitution. This confusion over the proximate cause
requirement has caused great discrepancies in the amounts of restitution
awarded.
AWARD CALCULATIONS
Under section 2259(b)(1), for an award of restitution to be ordered,
the court must make three determinations: “(1) that the individual
seeking restitution is a ‘victim’ of the defendant’s offense, . . . 2) that the
defendant’s offense was a proximate cause of the victim’s losses . . . and
(3) that the losses so caused can be calculated with ‘some reasonable
certainty.’”76
The courts are in dispute as to whether section 2259 allows the
victim to recover only for the losses that can be attributed to the injury
caused by the offender or whether it allows the victim to recover for the
full amount of her losses without taking into account the contribution
that the offender has directly made.77 18 U.S.C.A. section 2259 mandates
that the court award restitution to victims “in the full amount of the
victim’s losses” and does not allow the court to decline the order because
of “(i) the economic circumstances of the defendant; or (ii) the fact that a
victim has, or is entitled to, receive compensation for his or her injuries
from the proceeds of insurance or any other source.” 78 18 U.S.C.A.
section 3664(h) governs the awards of restitution under section 2259, and
states that the court “may make each defendant liable for payment of the
full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the
defendants to reflect the level of contribution to the victim’s loss.”79 The
decision of the court whether to hold the defendant as jointly and
severally liable or to apportion the restitution among all of the defendants
is within the court’s discretion.80
In United States v. Nucci, after pleading guilty to conspiracy and
use of a firearm during a robbery, the court ordered Nucci to pay the
restitution amount of $34,476 under the MVRA and 18 U.S.C.A. section
3664.81 The victims of Nucci’s crimes only suffered monetary losses.82
The judge ordered Nucci to pay the value of the items that were stolen
76
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from his victims.83 The court held that it was proper for Nucci to be held
jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the restitution. 84
Nucci’s concern was that the failure of the court to offset the restitution
by other co-defendants could create a possibility that the victim could
“receive a windfall by being overcompensated.”85 In section 3664(h), the
statute states that:
If the court finds that more than one defendant has contributed to
the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for
payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion
liability among the defendants to reflect the level of contribution
to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances of each
defendant.86

The statute does not expressly prevent double recovery.87 However,
the court in Nucci suggested that, at common law, joint and several
liability does not permit “double-recovery.” 88 The court restated that
“[t]he effect of joint liability in a tort context is to excuse one defendant
from paying any portion of the judgment if the plaintiff collects the full
amount from the other [defendant].”89 Section 3664(k) implies that the
court can apply joint and several liability because it allows courts to
readjust orders of restitution once the victim receives the full amount of
her losses. 90 With that understanding, the argument of the offender
concerning double recovery is moot. Joint and several liability allows
victims like Amy and Vicky to collect restitution for the harms caused by
offenders who acted separately.91
Unlike in Nucci, where the co-defendants were involved in the
same case, in United States v. Monzel, the court expressed confusion as
to whether joint and several liability could be imposed upon defendants
in different cases.92 The court stated that “it is unclear, however, whether
joint and several liability may be imposed upon defendants in separate
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cases.”93 Although nothing in the statute forbids joint and several liability
upon defendants in different cases.94
In United States v. Aumais, the court originally ordered Aumais to
pay $48,483 in restitution to cover Amy’s future counseling costs.95 The
magistrate judge determined that the “harm from the uncle’s abuse and
that from possession of the images . . . cannot be separate[d] to allocate
costs between them . . . Amy will require counseling for both.”96 The
Court of Appeals for Aumais reversed the order granting restitution
holding that if Amy would need counseling for both the harm of the
initial abuse and for the harm based on the possession of the images,
Aumais could not be held responsible for all of Amy’s losses.97 The court
found that the wording in section 2259 called for the full amount of the
victim’s losses as a result of the offender’s possession. 98 The Aumais
court suggested that section 3664(h) imposes joint and several liability
only when a single judge is dealing with multiple defendants in a single
case.99 The expressed language in the statute, however, does not support
this understanding. 100 The court admitted that the statute “does not
contemplate apportionment of liability among defendants in different
cases, before different judges, and in different jurisdictions around the
country.”101
In United States v. Lundquist, the court disagreed with the
understanding of joint and several liability in Aumais.102 The court held
that although Amy’s Victim Impact Statement was drafted a year before
the defendant was arrested, psychological reports after the arrest
determined that her knowledge of individuals exchanging and the
viewing of her photographs over the internet re-victimized her. 103 The
Lundquist court held that although other defendants had been convicted
and found to have contributed to Amy’s losses, nothing in the statute
states that the defendants must be in the same case and before the same
93
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judge to have joint and several liability ordered.104 The Lundquist court
further stated that Amy would never be able to fully recover for all of her
losses, unless presiding judges would find joint and several liability
against other defendants on trial in other cases, because of the likelihood
that few defendants would have the financial means to pay the ordered
restitution.105
The court found it fair to hold one defendant liable for the full
amount of the restitution, rather than apportioning the liability among all
of the offenders for four reasons. 106 The first reason is that given the
likely decrease in the share of the responsibility of each new defendant,
and the fact that the defendants are unlikely to have sufficient funds, the
only way that the victim can be made whole is through joint and several
liability.107 The second reason for holding the defendant liable for the full
amount of restitution is because any “perceived unfairness” is minimized
by the fact that the court will qualify the order so that the defendant
would only pay the amount remaining of the loss and discount the total
with any amounts paid by others. 108 The third reason addresses the
concern that a victim may receive “double recovery” but is minimized or
eliminated by the fact that the court directs the government to keep track
of payments made that involve numerous jurisdictions across the
country. 109 The court commented that it was confident that Amy’s
representative and government officials possessed the resources to
determine both how much Amy had received in restitution and what
losses the money was intended to cover.110 The Lundquist court noted
that individuals had already started keeping track of these items so that
“double recovery” can be avoided. 111 The fourth reason acknowledges
that some prior cases argued that large restitution claims violated the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Lundquist, the
court responded to this concern by stating that the restitution is remedial,
not punitive.112 Although in some cases, the restitution order may seem
“harsh,” the order is neither “(a) grossly disproportionate to the very
serious crime of receiving and possessing child pornography, nor (b)
unusual in the constitutional sense.”113 For these reasons, the court found
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that joint and several liability was proper.114 The court ordered Lundquist
to pay the remaining portion of $3,381,159.00 to Amy that had not
already been paid by previous offenders. 115 The total loss was then
broken down to include future counseling expenses in the amount of
$512,681.00, lost wages and benefits in the amount of $2,855,173.00,
and attorney’s fees and other costs to total $17,063.00.116
For those courts that have not applied joint and several liability to
the defendant(s), many have struggled with the method for calculating a
restitutionary award under section 2259.117 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
the ruling in United States v. McDaniel, awarding restitution of $12,700,
even though the mechanism for calculating the awarded amount could
not be explained.118 In United States v. Monzel, the court repeated the
decision in United States v. Doe, stating, “where the harm is ongoing and
the number of offenders impossible to pinpoint, such a determination
will inevitably involve some degree of approximation.”119 The courts are
asked to estimate, based upon the facts presented, to award an amount
with “reasonable certainty.” 120 The court in Kennedy suggested
developing a reasonable estimate as to the number of offenders that
would possibly be prosecuted over the lifetime of the victim and divide
that number into the total amount of the victim’s losses.121
ALTERNATIVES
Various judges when determining awards of restitution interpret the
statutory language of section 2259 differently. Some courts have
awarded nothing to the victims, while others have awarded the victim in
excess of three million dollars. A major question is: what happens to the
offender who has images when the child victim cannot be identified? The
intention and purpose of the statute is legitimate and vital; however, the
confusion of the proximate cause interpretation, and the absence of
guidelines for calculating awards of restitution, have added confusion to
this situation. In Kennedy, the prosecution suggested a flat fine of one
thousand dollars per image.122 The court dismissed this idea because it
found no evidence to suggest that the amount was the “full amount of
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[Amy and Vicky’s] losses.” 123 The court found no support for a one
thousand dollar per image fine by the current wording within the statute;
however, the argument can be made that the statute be amended to
remove the wording that awards the victim the “full amount of victim’s
losses” and be replaced with a flat fine per image to be paid to the victim,
up to the full amount of the victim’s losses. If the offender’s images are
able to be identified and linked to a particular victim, then the money for
each image could be paid directly to the identified victim—up to the total
amount of the victim’s losses. If the victim is unable to be identified at
the time of the conviction of the offender, then the fines for the
unidentified victims can be deposited into a federal fund set up for the
victims. If the unidentified victim is later identified, then that victim
could apply to the fund to be paid an award of restitution. With this type
of system in place, every offender would be fined for each and every
image he possesses. As of now, an offender who is convicted of
possessing multiple images of child pornography lucks out if none of the
victims depicted in those images are identified. With a flat fine for each
image possessed, every offender pays.
A possible concern is that a victim may receive more than his or her
loss. However, this concern is easily overcome because the payments the
offender is ordered to remit can be made through the state or federal
system that can be monitored, not exceeding the total amount of losses.
Similar to the current process, the victim would identify the types and
amount of total losses in a Victim Impact Statement. This statement
could be kept on file with the state so that the notifications that are
currently sent to the victims each time an offender is arrested with his or
her images could instead be sent to the manager of the child pornography
victims’ fund to allow disbursement of the restitution award to the victim
once it is collected from the offender.
The CVRA specifies that the government must notify the victims
upon an arrest if their images are obtained; this seems to add to the
recurring pain and suffering by the victim. However, if the victim were
allowed to have the notification letters bypass his or her mail, and assign
the letters to go to the foundation that is set up to manage the funds, the
victim would not have the daily reminders sitting in his or her mailbox
that could reopen wounds.
CONCLUSION
The intention of the statute is genuine; however, the application is
not consistent. If Congress were to review the decisions of the different
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circuits, it would become aware of the fact that the wording of the statute
is causing great confusion. Although the purpose of the statute is clear,
revisions must be made to encourage consistency and proper
compensation for victims who have already suffered immense pain.
Congress has the power to revise the wording in the statute to clarify the
proximate cause requirement, and to specify whether joint and several
liability or a different type of calculation method would be appropriate
when courts order awards of restitution. It is likely that every sitting
judge on the bench who hears the injuries that are repeatedly inflicted
upon the victims of child pornography will want to ease the pain and
suffering by awarding financial compensation; however, because the
wording of the statute is ambiguous, sometimes justice is not served.
Attorney Christopher G. Green, in his brief to the United States Supreme
Court, representing the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, stated it best, “[u]ntil the Court provides clarity, child
pornography victims will face uncertain prospects for the recovery of
their losses even as they continue to be exploited by offenders
nationwide.” 124 Child pornography victims deserve to have a line of
consistent rulings; and society as a whole should not sit back and allow
the continued confusion that section 2259 has caused.
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